An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in Ethereum Smart Contracts by Saraph, Vikram & Herlihy, Maurice
An Empirical Study of Speculative Concurrency in
Ethereum Smart Contracts
Vikram Saraph
Department of Computer Science, Brown University, USA
vsaraph@cs.brown.edu
Maurice Herlihy
Department of Computer Science, Brown University, USA
mph@cs.brown.edu
Abstract
We use historical data to estimate the potential benefit of speculative techniques for executing
Ethereum smart contracts in parallel. We replay transaction traces of sampled blocks from the
Ethereum blockchain over time, using a simple speculative execution engine. In this engine, miners
attempt to execute all transactions in a block in parallel, rolling back those that cause data conflicts.
Aborted transactions are then executed sequentially. Validators execute the same schedule as miners.
We find that our speculative technique yields estimated speed-ups starting at about 8-fold in
2016, declining to about 2-fold at the end of 2017, where speed-up is measured using either gas costs
or instruction counts. We also observe that a small set of contracts are responsible for many data
conflicts resulting from speculative concurrent execution.
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1 Introduction
A blockchain is a distributed data structure that implements a ledger : a tamper-proof,
widely-accessible, append-only sequence of transactions. Blockchains form the basis for
cryptocurrencies [8, 10, 11, 12, 13] and other applications that must maintain a shared state
in the absence of a trusted central authority. In the Ethereum [8] blockchain, for example, if
Alice wants to send a coin to Bob, she broadcasts her transaction to one or more miners,
who package transactions into blocks, and then undertake a consensus protocol to agree on
which block should be appended next to the shared blockchain. A validator is any party
who reads the blockchain state and checks it for correctness. Miners are validators, of course,
but so is any party who needs to query the blockchain state.
In many blockchain systems, client transactions can invoke scripts, often called smart
contracts, or just contracts, that perform logic needed to support complex services such as
trading, voting, and managing tokens. Here, we focus on Ethereum-style smart contracts.
Ethereum’s smart contracts present a concurrency challenge. To reconstruct the block-
chain’s current state, each validator must re-execute, in a sequential, one-at-a-time order,
every call to every smart contract. Such sequential validation is unattractive because it fails
to exploit the concurrency provided by modern multicore architectures. Simply executing
those calls in parallel is unsafe, because there may be dependencies between contracts: if one
contract depends on the results of another, then those contracts must be executed in the same
order by every validator. Because the Ethereum smart contract language is Turing-complete,
and because contracts can reference one another through untyped function pointers, static
analysis is unlikely to be broadly effective.
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The most promising approach to concurrent execution of smart contracts is speculation
[1, 4, 7]: the virtual machine executes contract calls in parallel against the current state,
tracking each transaction’s read set and write set (memory locations read and written).
Writes to memory are intercepted and buffered. Two transactions conflict if they access the
same memory location, and one access is a write. For every pair of conflicting transactions,
one is discarded, and the other is committed. Speculative techniques typically work well
when conflicts are rare, but perform poorly when conflicts are common.
1.1 Contributions
How well does speculative concurrency work for smart contract execution? This paper makes
the following contributions. We exploit publicly-available historical data to estimate conflict
rates in an existing blockchain. This methodology, replaying the historical transaction record
against proposed alternative run-times, could be a useful model for other blockchain-centered
investigations. This study is exploratory: it aspires to provide a relatively fast and cheap
estimate of how well certain strategies are likely to do in practice, with the goal of focusing
future research attention in directions more likely to be productive. Of course, an exploratory
study necessarily employs sampling, estimation, and approximation.
As described below in more detail, we re-execute blocks sampled from the Ethereum
blockchain against a simple speculative execution engine. This engine has two phases: in
the first (concurrent) phase, all transactions are run in parallel. In the second (sequential)
phase, transactions observed to conflict are discarded and re-run in one-at-a-time order. This
execution strategy produced speed-ups ranging from about 8-fold for blocks sampled from
2016, gradually declining to about 2-fold for blocks sampled from 2017.
This study makes the following observations.
Even simple speculative strategies yield non-trivial speed-ups.
Over time, however, these speed-ups declined as transaction traffic increased.
Distinguishing between reads and writes is important: treating a transaction’s read and
write sets as a single conflict set substantially increases conflict rates.
More aggressive speculative strategies, such as running multiple concurrent phases, yield
little additional benefit.
Accurate static conflict analysis may yield a modest benefit.
Increasing the number of cores in the simulated virtual machine from 16 to 64 improved
speed-ups, but there was little improvement above 64 cores.
In high-contention periods, most contention resulted from a very small number of popular
contracts.
These observations suggest some directions for further research.
In periods of high contention, most conflict is caused by a small number of very popular
contracts. Today, contract writers have no motivation for avoiding such conflicts. It
could be productive to devise incentives, perhaps in the form of reduced gas prices, for
contracts that produce fewer data conflicts.
Many data conflicts, such as crediting and debiting account balances, are probably
artifacts of defining conflict naïvely in terms of read-write sets. Perhaps conflicts could
be reduced by extending the virtual machine to provide explicit support for common
commutative operations such as credits and debits.
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1.2 Methodology in Brief
We replay each transaction in a block, computing each transaction’s read and write sets. We
then greedily sort the transactions into two bins: the concurrent bin holds transactions that
do not conflict with any other transaction already in the concurrent bin, and the sequential
bin holds the rest.
We then estimate the elapsed time required to (1) execute the concurrent bin transactions
in parallel (including the cost of detecting and discarding conflicting transactions), followed
by (2) sequentially executing the sequential bin transactions.
Since we do not have a parallel EVM implementation to test, we estimate a transaction’s
running time in two ways: either by the gas it consumed, or by the number of Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode instructions executed. (Both measures are easy to compute,
and yield similar results.) The speed-up is the ratio between the estimated elapsed times for
the sequential executions versus the longest speculative execution.
In the next section we describe related work. In Section 3, we outline Ethereum’s
architecture, smart contracts, and all relevant terminology. Section 4 describes the setup
of our empirical study along with statistics summarizing observed results, while in Section
5, we consider various alternatives to the baseline setup. Finally, in Sections 6 and 7, we
discuss conclusions and potential future directions for extending this work.
2 Related Work
Smart contracts were first proposed by Szabo [15].
Bitcoin [12] includes a scripting language of limited power. Ethereum [8] is perhaps
the most widely used smart contract platform, running on a quasi-Turing-complete virtual
machine. Solidity [14] is the most popular programming language for the Ethereum virtual
machine. Other blockchains that support smart contracts include Corda [5] and Cardano [9].
Hyperledger Fabric [4] is a permissioned blockchain where transactions (calls to smart con-
tracts) are executed speculatively in parallel against the latest committed state. Transactions’
read and write sets are recorded and compared, and conflicting contracts are discarded.
Dickerson et al. [7] have proposed a speculative execution model where miners dynamically
construct a fork-join schedule that allows concurrent executions without violating transaction
dependencies. Anjana et al. [1] propose a way to extend this approach to lock-free executions.
3 Ethereum Smart Contracts
In this section, we provide some background on Ethereum smart contracts, mining, and
validation of Ethereum blocks.
3.1 The Architecture
In Ethereum, as in other blockchains, multiple nodes follow a common protocol in which
transactions from clients are packaged into blocks, and nodes use a consensus protocol to
agree on successive blocks. Each block includes a cryptographic hash of its predecessor,
making it difficult to tamper with the ledger.
Each client has ownership of one or more accounts, so that each transaction occurs
between a sender account and a recipient account. The majority of transactions are one of
two kinds: either a value transfer, which is a purely monetary transfer of ether from sender
to recipient, or a contract call, where the sender account makes a call to code associated with
the recipient account.
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1 contract StorageInterface {
2 mapping (uint => uint) storage;
3
4 function getValue(uint key) returns (uint) {
5 return storage [key ];
6 }
7
8 function setValue(uint key, uint value) {
9 storage [key] = value;
10 }
11 }
(a) This code is a simple smart contract written in the Solidity
language. The contract, StorageInterface , contains a Solid-
ity mapping named storage, and has functions getValue and
setValue. Mappings are essentially hash tables that store key-
value pairs, and are the primary means of accessing Ethereum
contract storage. Figure 1b shows a snippet of the bytecode
after compiling the Solidity contract. The bytecode is what is
published in the blockchain.
247 ...
248 JUMPDEST
249 DUP1
250 PUSH1 0x0
251 DUP1
252 DUP5
253 DUP2
254 MSTORE
255 PUSH1 0x20
256 ADD
257 SWAP1
258 DUP2
259 MSTORE
260 PUSH1 0x20
261 ADD
262 PUSH1 0x0
263 KECCAK256
264 DUP2
265 SWAP1
266 SSTORE
267 POP
268 ...
(b) Bytecode resulting from
compiling the contract.
Figure 1 An example Solidity smart contract and a fragment of the corresponding bytecode.
Some Ethereum accounts, in addition to maintaining a balance of ether, possess associated
code called a smart contract. A smart contract resembles an object in a programming language,
with a long-lived state recorded in the blockchain. This state is manipulated by a set of
functions called either directly by clients (top-level calls) or indirectly by other smart contracts
(internal calls). To ensure that function calls terminate, each computational step incurs a
cost in gas, paid by the caller. The caller specifies a maximum amount of gas it is willing to
pay, and if the charge exceeds that sum, the computation is terminated and rolled back, and
the caller’s gas is not refunded. Nevertheless, the rolled-back transaction is still recorded on
the blockchain.
A smart contract’s code consists of a sequence of bytecode instructions, taken from the
Ethereum bytecode instruction set. Every bytecode instruction consumes a certain amount
of gas. Each client runs an instance of the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM), which executes
calls to smart contracts and runs their sequence of instructions. While users may author
smart contracts in higher level languages such as Solidity, these contracts must ultimately be
compiled into EVM bytecode, since it is the bytecode that is published in the blockchain.
The virtual machine specification, the bytecode instruction set, and all associated gas costs
are described in Ethereum’s “Yellow Paper” [16].
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3.2 Mining and Validation
Smart contracts are first executed by miners, or nodes that repeatedly propose new blocks
to append to the blockchain. When a miner creates a block, it selects a sequence of client
transactions and executes their smart contract codes in sequence, transforming the old
contract state into a new state.
Once a block has been appended to the blockchain, that block’s smart contracts are
re-executed by validators, or nodes that reconstruct (and check) the current blockchain state.
Each miner validates blocks proposed by other miners, and older blocks are validated by
newly-joined miners, or by clients querying the contract state. Once a contract is in a block,
it is effectively re-executed forever (in Ethereum), so contract executions by validators vastly
exceed executions by miners.
As noted earlier, one drawback of the Ethereum protocol is that a block’s contracts are
executed in a one-at-a-time order, so miners and validators cannot exploit modern multicore
architectures. Contracts cannot be executed concurrently in a naïve way, because they share
storage, and may be subject to data conflicts, that is, concurrent accesses to the same the
storage variables.
In the absence of explicit concurrency guidelines, we execute transactions speculatively in
parallel, allowing non-conflicting contracts to commit, but rolling back conflicting transactions,
and running them sequentially in a second phase.
A novel aspect of this study is that we analyze the effectiveness of speculation against the
historical record of transactions actually executed on the Ethereum blockchain, replaying their
bytecode instructions. We are not aware of an Ethereum virtual machine implementation
that supports concurrency, so we simulate concurrent transaction execution by stepping
through each transaction’s instructions, using eager conflict detection to sort each block’s
transactions into a conflict-free parallel bin, and a conflicted sequential bin. This strategy is
simple and scalable, a natural starting point for an empirical study.
4 The Baseline Experiment
Here we describe the baseline experiment testing the effectiveness of a simple speculative
execution strategy against historical transaction data from the Ethereum blockchain. In
Section 5, we describe variations on this baseline strategy that probe the sensitivity of our
measurements, as well as alternative speculative strategies.
4.1 Setting up the Experiment
We set up an Ethereum node by installing and running the Ethereum Go client, also known as
geth . The geth client allows one to synchronize with other network nodes and reconstruct
the blockchain by validating each block. The client comes packaged with an interface for
fetching data from the blockchain, as well as debugging tools for inspecting transactions. The
debugging API includes a utility for reproducing the bytecode trace of a given transaction.
The geth client can run in various synchronization modes, which determine what and
how much old state the client records. For example, a client running in light mode will keep
track of the blockchain’s current state only, while in archive mode, the client maintains the
full log of all previous states.
Using the geth API, it is straightforward to retrieve any given smart contract’s bytecode.
However, the only way to tell how that bytecode affects the blockchain state is by re-
executing each transaction before it. Therefore we use geth’s tracing utility to re-execute
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Figure 2 Historical periods analyzed superimposed on number of transactions per day.
Period Interval Blocks Transactions Calls
1 Sept 1 – 8, 2016 4200 32502 11779
2 Nov 17 – 24, 2016 4200 32648 11070
3 Feb 2 – 9, 2017 3600 26415 10586
4 Apr 20 – 27, 2017 4100 56051 23684
5 July 6 – 13, 2017 3400 197003 84219
6 Sept 21 – 28, 2017 2100 200980 96043
7 Dec 7 – 14, 2017 4100 557471 255872
Figure 3 Number of blocks, transactions, and contract calls analyzed in each historical period.
transactions, running the client in archive mode so it can reference past states. We found
that reconstructing the blockchain from scratch in this way was much too slow to be feasible
on an ordinary computer (an archive blockchain sync could not even keep up with the current
blockchain growth rate), so we obtained a baseline copy of the blockchain from the ConSenSys
archive [3] dating from Ethereum’s origins in 2016 to early October 2017. Starting from this
base, we used the geth utilities to synchronize up to December 2017.
Between these dates, the Ethereum blockchain contains about 4 million blocks and
100 million transactions, far too much data to analyze in detail in a reasonable time with
reasonable resources. Instead, we chose to focus on seven historical periods between July
2016 (after the DAO fork) and December 2017. Each period spans roughly one week, with
consecutive periods separated by 11 weeks, so that each day of the month is considered. Due
to computational limitations, we analyze every 10th block in each of the seven historical
periods. Figure 2 shows these periods superimposed on the number of transactions per day
at that time.
4.2 The Greedy Concurrent EVM
We simulated a concurrent EVM that executes transactions speculatively in parallel using
the following greedy strategy. For each block, execution proceeds in two phases, an initial
concurrent phase, and a subsequent sequential phase. We consider execution engines with
either 16, 32, or 64 threads. In the concurrent phase, each thread chooses a transaction
from the block and executes it speculatively. If that transaction encounters a conflict, the
transaction’s effects are rolled back, and that transaction is deferred to the second, sequential
phase. When a thread finishes executing a transaction, it picks another to execute, continuing
until all transactions in the current block have been chosen.
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The second phase starts when the first phase is complete: the transactions that encountered
data conflicts in the first phase are re-executed sequentially. In the second phase, data conflicts
are not an issue since transactions are explicitly serialized and state changes committed
sequentially.
Two transactions conflict if they access the same storage location, and at least one access
is a write. Transactions that do not conflict are said to commute, because interleaving them
in any order yields the same transaction and storage states. At a more granular level, two
bytecode operations conflict if applying them in different orders yields different storage states.
Most bytecode operations, such as arithmetic operations and others that interact with local
state, commute with one another. Bytecode operations that interact with shared state, on
the other hand, can potentially conflict.
The EVM operations SLOAD and SSTORE read from and write to persistent storage,
respectively, and are used for nearly every state access and state modification. By far the
most common conflicts arise from conflicting these two operations. Other kinds of conflicts,
while possible, are assumed to be too rare to monitor. For example, one transaction might
create a new contract, while another calls the newly created contract in a way that creates a
race condition: the call may or may not arrive before the contract is initialized. There is also
a bytecode operation that reads a given account’s balance, which is part of the blockchain’s
shared state.
We detect conflicts by associating a read-write lock with each storage location. Each
SLOAD (respectively, SSTORE) operation requests that location’s lock in read (write) mode.
If a transaction requests a lock that is already held in a conflicting mode by another
transaction, the requesting transaction is rolled back and deferred to the next phase. No
locks are released until the concurrent phase ends, even those held by aborted transactions.
This is to ensure that no interleaving of transactions in the concurrent bin result in a conflict
when re-executed by validators.
4.3 Sampling and Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the concurrent speculative execution strategy on the data set
of transaction traces as described in the experimental setup (see Section 4.1). Traces from
the historical Ethereum blockchain are used to simulate what would have happened if the
original blocks of transactions were instead re-executed concurrently.
Our principal figure of merit is speed-up: the ratio between the time to execute a block’s
transactions sequentially, and the time to execute the same transactions concurrently and
speculatively. For now, we use cumulative gas costs as a proxy for time. Then to estimate
speed-up, we measure the ratio between (1) the gas consumed to execute a block’s transactions
sequentially, versus (2) the maximum gas used by any thread in the parallel phase plus the
gas needed to execute the sequential phase. Note that an aborted transaction may be counted
twice: once (partially) in the concurrent phase, up to when the transaction is aborted, and
once in the sequential phase when the aborted transaction is re-executed in isolation.
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4.4 Baseline Results
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Figure 4 Average speed-up and conflict rate for each of the seven historical time intervals.
Increased Ethereum activity over time is reflected by decreasing speed-up and higher conflict rates.
Figure 4 summarizes speed-up statistics over the seven historical periods, along with the
conflict rates, or the percentage of contract calls that abort per block. The average speed-up
and conflict rate are shown for simulated VMs of 16, 32, and 64 cores, where averages are
weighted by the number of contract call transactions in each block.
Earlier periods display higher speed-ups and lower conflict rates because transaction
volume and contention are low. For example, speed-up is as high as 3.23 in the second
historical period on a simulated EVM with 16 cores, and this number rises to 8.87 for a 64
core EVM. During the same interval, contract calls abort at a rate of only 20%.
As the volume of transactions increases over time, however, so does the rate of transaction
conflict, so more time is spent sequentially re-executing transactions aborted during the
concurrent phase. This naturally leads to lower speed-ups, since there is less opportunity to
parallelize transaction execution. Indeed, during the December 2017 period, with 16 threads,
roughly 34% of transactions abort. Nevertheless, it is notable that there is still a modest but
positive speed-up of 1.13 even then. Moreover, this speed-up effectively doubles, to slightly
more than 2 when there are 64 threads. When transaction volume is higher, using more
threads yields more speed-up.
4.5 Speed-up Distributions
The average speed-up of each historical period provides little insight into how the blocks’ speed-
ups are distributed in each period. Here, we further analyze the performance of speculative
execution by looking at the distributions of these speed-ups. Due to space limitations, we
focus on historical periods 5, 6, and 7, since these have the highest transaction volumes.
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 5, 32 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 5, 64 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 6, 16 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 6, 32 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 6, 64 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 7, 16 Cores
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Speed-up Distribution: Period 7, 32 Cores
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Figure 5 Speed-up distributions for each combination of historical periods 5, 6, and 7, and with
16, 32, and 64 cores. Each plot depicts one such combination. Blocks are binned in increments of
0.25 according to speed-up realized. Distributions are normalized so that total area is roughly 1.
Speed-up distributions of the three periods are depicted in Figure 5. Each plot is
normalized to represent an approximate probability density, so that the y-axis is interpreted
as a relative count. Since there is relatively less contention in Periods 5 and 6, their speed-up
distributions are flatter, with longer tails. This is because more blocks during these periods
are able to exhibit a higher amount of speed-up. However, when the transaction rate is
higher, as in seventh period of December 2017, the distributions are concentrated closed to 1,
since more work is wasted as the number of aborted transactions rises.
As noted before, some blocks may realize a slowdown when using our concurrent execution
strategy, a result of the cost of aborting and re-executing conflicting transactions. The relative
number of such blocks is shown in plots of Figure 5, where regions to the left of 1 represent
blocks that are slowed down. Making more cores available to the EVM appears to reduce the
number of slowed-down blocks for each of the three historical periods. Though fewer than
3% blocks are slowed down for both Periods 5 and 6 when using 16 cores, this percentage
jumps to 46% for Period 7. However, when the EVM’s number of cores is increased to 32,
the percentage of blocks that are slowed down drops substantially to only 13%.
4.6 Storage Hot-Spots
Next, we investigate transaction contention by analyzing how often certain storage addresses
are accessed by transactions. In particular, we look at memory addresses that are conflict
points for pairs of transactions, and how many times each such address results in a conflict.
Addresses that attract a high number of conflicts are informally called hot-spots.
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Figure 6 Histograms of conflicts per address. Addresses that results in a large number of conflicts
are hot-spots. Period 7 has a much heavier tail, corresponding to many more address hot-spots.
In Figure 6, we plot histograms illustrating the number of conflicts per address, for
historical periods 5, 6, and 7. Each storage address with at least one conflict is binned
according to how many conflicts occurred at that address. For example, in Period 5, there
are 2562 unique storage addresses at which there were exactly 2 conflicts. Periods 5 and 6
have relatively few storage addresses with high contention, and this pattern is similar to
the earlier historical periods. However, Period 7’s histogram has a much heavier tail than
the other two histograms, meaning that there are many more storage addresses with larger
numbers of conflicts. In other words, there is a handful of addresses that many different
transactions attempt to access, most likely a result of so many transactions calling the same
few contracts. We elaborate on this observations in Section 5.6 below.
5 Alternative Experiments
We extended the baseline experiment with a number of other experiments intended to test
the effectiveness of alternative strategies, and to test the sensitivity of our approximations.
5.1 Sampling
To test whether sampling 1 in 10 blocks during a period yielded a distorted view, we ran
a detailed simulation of one period (Period 5) to compare the results with the sampled
simulation. There is a modest difference in speed-up, and an even more negligible difference
in abort rate. Some discrepancy can also be explained by the inherent randomness of a
concurrent scheduler.
Sampling rate
Speed-up Abort rate
16 cores 32 cores 64 cores 16 cores 32 cores 64 cores
1-in-10 sampling 2.063 2.694 2.859 25.98% 27.23% 27.88%
All blocks 2.085 2.717 2.913 25.96% 27.21% 27.86%
Figure 7 Accuracy of 1-in-10 sampling for historical period 5.
5.2 Multiple Phases
The greedy, two-phase strategy can be generalized to encompass multiple concurrent phases,
so that each transaction that was deferred in one concurrent phase is instead re-executed
in another subsequent concurrent phase. It is possible that multiple concurrent phases
could provide additional speed-up. However, as illustrated in Figure 8a, we found in our
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experiments that executing two concurrent phases almost always yields less speed-up than
executing a single concurrent phase. This decrease is due to the duplicate work performed by
transactions rolled back in multiple phases, with not enough additional speed-up yielded in
the latter concurrent phases. Therefore, in practice, one current phase is sufficient to realize
almost all potential concurrency.
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(a) Speed-up with multiple concurrent phases
for transaction execution.
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(b) Speed-up when the EVM uses mutex locks
to lock storage addresses.
Figure 8 Multiple phases and data conflicts figures.
5.3 Data Conflicts
In our simulated concurrent EVM, transactions access storage addresses by first acquiring a
read-write lock. This allows multiple transactions to read an address, with no conflict, if
there are no concurrent writers. In principle, this decreases the number of conflicts when
compared to using mutex locks, hence increasing the potential speed-up.
To determine whether read-write locks reduce data conflicts in practice, we investigated
the effect of simplifying the conflict model by merging all data accesses into a single conflict
set, by using mutex locks for conflict detection. With the exception of the last historical
period in which speed-up is already low, the speed-ups were substantially worse than the
speed-ups obtained by distinguishing between read and write accesses. See Figure 8b for a
comparison of the two locking schemes when using 16 cores. These results suggest that there
is significant value in implementing a concurrent EVM with read-write locks, instead of the
simpler mutex locks.
5.4 Proxies for Time
Since we do not have access to an actual concurrent EVM, we must estimate how long it
takes to execute each transaction. There are two straightforward choices: we can count the
number of instructions executed by each transaction, or we can tally the gas cost of executing
the transaction’s instructions. The first choice assumes that each EVM instruction takes
roughly the same time to execute, while the second assumes that instruction gas cost is
roughly proportional to execution time. For example, the arithmetic operations MUL and
DIV require 5 units of gas, while SSTORE and SLOAD cost 200001 and 200 units respectively.
All speed-ups reported so far were measured in terms of gas costs. As a sanity check,
for 16 cores, we recomputed speed-ups using instruction count as a proxy for time. These
speed-ups are shown in Figure 9a. There does not appear to be any significant qualitative
difference between gas cost and instruction count.
1 SSTORE costs 20000 units when storing a non-zero value, but costs only 5000 units otherwise.
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Figure 9 Proxies for time and static conflict prediction figures.
5.5 Static Conflict Prediction
If we were able to predict whether a transaction would abort if executed speculatively, then
we could save the cost of transaction roll-back and retry. We can simulate the effect of a
perfect conflict predictor simply by ignoring the cost of aborted transactions, as in Figure
9b. However, doing so yields a negligible change in speed-ups, less than 0.1% in most cases.
The only exception is the very last period (December 2017), where contention was very
high. For that historical period, the average speed-up increases from 1.13 to 1.22. These
numbers suggest that static conflict analysis, if accurate enough, may yield modest gains
during periods of high contention.
5.6 Omitting Hot-spot Contracts
In most of the previous analysis, Period 7 stands out among the selected historical periods
as being particularly high volume and contentious. Recall that this period was sampled from
December 2017, which is close to peak Ethereum transaction activity. More specifically, Period
7 occurred when there was great interest from the general public over CryptoKitties [2] [6], a
recreational game deployed on Ethereum in which users create, breed, and trade virtual cats.
The popularity of CryptoKitties is especially apparent when using any blockchain explorer to
browse Ethereum transactions during December 2017. The popularity of CryptoKitties was
responsible for congesting the Ethereum network, though interest in it has since died down.
In light of the CryptoKitties frenzy, we reanalyzed Period 7 under a hypothetical scenario
in which the CryptoKitties contracts 2 did not exist. This is easily accomplished by ignoring
all calls to the CryptoKitties contracts when tracing each block’s transactions and replaying
them, and calculating the resulting statistics.
2 The vast majority of calls to CryptoKitties are to its core contract (which has address hash
0x06012c8cf97bead5deae237070f9587f8e7a266d), and to an auction contract (which has address hash
0xb1690c08e213a35ed9bab7b318de14420fb57d8c).
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Figure 10 Speed-up analysis after removing high-contention or high-volume contracts.
After filtering out all calls to CryptoKitties contracts, speed-up using 16 cores rises from
1.13 to 1.65. These calls accounted for about 31% of all contract calls, and furthermore, by
filtering out CryptoKitties, the number of contract calls per block drops from 62 to 43, which
is much closer to the 46 calls per block in Period 6. While a speed-up of 1.65 does not quite
match speed-up from older periods, it is still clear from this simple analysis that much of the
contention in Period 7 is caused solely by CryptoKitties.
To further illustrate the impact that CryptoKitties had, we reproduce the conflict histo-
gram from the previous section, using the same hypothetical scenario with no CryptoKitties.
Recall that the conflict histogram of Period 7 had a much heavier tail than the corresponding
histograms of older intervals. However when CryptoKitties is removed, Period 7’s histogram
(Figure 10a) has a much thinner tail, resembling the other histograms. Indeed, in Period 6,
10% of conflicting storage addresses have at least 5 conflicts, but in Period 7, this same number
is 30%. However, if CryptoKitties contracts are ignored, then only 14% or conflicting address
have at least 5 conflicts. These numbers demonstrate that CryptoKitties is responsible for
many storage hot-spots.
We generalize this analysis to the other historical periods by determining the top five
most conflicting smart contracts in each period, and reproducing scenarios where none of the
highly conflicting contracts were called. As shown in Figure 10b, this results in a noticeable
speed-up in each period, not just the 7th. Most of these highly conflicting contracts are
actually token contracts; in fact, the most contentious contract from each period is either a
token (or a token exchange) contract. Therefore, analyzing these small sets of contracts may
provide insight into how to reduce contention when speculatively executing smart contracts
in parallel.
6 Discussion
As noted, this study is exploratory, incorporating various approximations and omissions. Most
such omissions are the result of the absence of a standard concurrent EVM implementation.
This study does not account for some EVM overheads, such as the costs for value transfers,
where one account transfers ether directly to another, without modifying storage. Value
transfers typically commute, and are likely much faster to execute than contract calls, though
they do make up the majority of all Ethereum transactions. Other sources of overhead
include solving a cryptographic puzzle to compute proof of work, which would affect miners’
speed-up but not the validators’.
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In the absence of a timing model for a concurrent EVM, this study uses gas costs (or
instruction counts) as proxies for time when computing speed-up. As noted, both proxies
yield essentially equivalent results.
This study relies on sampled blocks because the volume of data in the Ethereum block-
chain is simply too large to make exhaustive analysis practical or rewarding. An archive
synchronization of the blockchain was a major computational overhead for this study, in addi-
tion to recovering transaction traces. These overheads may be reduced as further Ethereum
tools and utilities are developed.
There are several reasons why speculative parallelism may sometimes yield little, or even
negative speed-up. For example, a block might contain one transaction substantially longer
than the others, whose execution time dominates the block execution time. In this case, it is
impossible to achieve much speed-up, no matter how these transactions are scheduled and
distributed among multiple cores. Or if a block contains very few contract call transactions,
there is little opportunity for speed-up. If a block’s transactions all access the same storage
location, perhaps because they all access the same popular contract [6], then speculation will
produce a negative speed-up as a result of the cost of rolling back so many misspeculated
transactions.
7 Conclusions
Our results suggest that a simple speculative strategy based on read-write set overlap can
produce non-trivial speed-ups, but that such speed-ups will decline as transaction rates
and conflict rates increase. More aggressive strategies, such as adding additional parallel
phases, seem to provide little additional benefit, because conflict appears to be bursty: if one
transaction conflicts with another, then it probably conflicts with multiple others.
The results of this study suggest that the most promising way to further increase
parallelism in Ethereum-style smart contract execution is to reduce the conflict rate, perhaps
by focusing on reducing unnecessary conflicts. We observed that splitting transactions’ data
sets into read sets and write sets decreased conflict rates substantially, suggesting that conflict
rates are sensitive to the semantics of concurrent operations on shared data. This observation
suggests that conflict rates might be reduced even further if the execution engine could do
a better job of recognizing when operations commute at the semantic level. For example,
transactions that increment or decrement the same account balance (a common occurrence)
have overlapping read and write sets, and are therefore deemed to conflict. At the semantic
level, however, these operations commute (in the absence of overflow or underflow), so as long
as the virtual machine’s memory operations are atomic, those operations need not conflict.
(Our study could not detect which conflicts are real, and which are artifacts, because only
compiled bytecode was available for analysis).
It might be profitable to investigate the effects of endowing the virtual machine with
intrinsic data types such as atomic counters or atomic sets that provide many commuting
mutator operations. Studying highly conflicting token contracts may provide insight into
which kinds of data types or operations would best alleviate contention.
Periods of high contention and low speed-up are caused by a relatively small number
of popular contracts. Currently, smart contract designers have no guidance how to avoid
speculative data conflicts, nor any incentive to do so. Our results suggest that there is a need
to devise incentives for smart contract programmers to design contracts in ways that reduce
conflicts, either by eliminating spurious conflicts, or by exploiting improved commuting
bytecode instructions.
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